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OBSCENITY: SEARCH AND SEIZURE
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
By ARTHUR L. BURNETT*
INTRODUCTION
The recent Supreme Court decisions on obscenity will un-
doubtedly precipitate a great deal of discussion among legal
scholars, practitioners, and within the judiciary as to the wisdom,
effect, and scope of the law in this highly controversial area.
Much attention will be devoted to the impact of these recent
decisions on the first amendment, but equally important is the
interaction between the first and fourth amendments. This arti-
cle will examine the current state of the law on obscenity as a
prelude to an analysis of the myriad issues that must be dealt
with when the attempts of the federal or state governments to
suppress allegedly obscene material conflict with an individual's
wishes to retain freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution.
I. THE STATE OF THE LAW OF OBSCENITY
In June 1973 the Supreme Court handed down eight related
decisions which dealt with various aspects of the law of obscenity.
Although the decisions themselves do not represent the definitive
statement which many judges, lawyers, and scholars had hoped
for, they do represent an effort by the Court to offer some concrete
standards in this most confused area of the law. An attempt is
made here to announce the current state of the law of obscenity
and to isolate related issues which remain unresolved.
A. From Roth to Miller: The Current Doctrine
Any meaningful discussion of a test of obscenity must com-
mence with Roth v. United States,I in which the Supreme Court
observed:
[Ilmplicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of
obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance. This
rejection for that reason is mirrored in the universal judgment that
obscenity should be restrained, reflected in the international agree-
ment of over 50 nations, in the obscenity laws of all of the 48 states,
* United States Magistrate, United States District Court, Washington, D.C.; B.A.,
1957, Howard University; LL.B., 1958, New York University School of Law.
1354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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and in the 20 obscenity laws enacted by the Congress from 1842 to
1956.2
In Roth the Supreme Court established the test of obscenity as
being "whether to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken
as a whole appeals to prurient interest."3
Elaboration of the Roth test occurred in 1964 in Jacobellis v.
Ohio,4 a case involving a motion picture film. In an opinion by
Justice Brennan, joined in only by Justice Goldberg, emphasis
was placed on the concept of "utterly without redeeming social
value." Finally, in 1966, the Roth test was restated and amplified
in another plurality opinion in A Book Named "John Cleland's
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts,' in which
Justice Brennan stated that in determining the obscenity of any
publication or film three elements must coalesce. First, the domi-
nant theme of the material taken as a whole must appeal to a
prurient interest in sex; second, the material must be patently
offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards
relating to the description or representation of sexual matters;
and third, the material must be utterly without redeeming social
value.' It was further pointed out that in evaluating the alleged
obscenity vel non, judges and juries must be careful not to weigh
a work's social importance against its prurient appeal, for these
elements must be considered individually and not balanced one
against the other.7
During the years following Memoirs, the inability of a major-
"2d. at 484-85.
:'Id. at 489. It has been stated that this was the only test in which a majority of five
Justices of the Supreme Court agreed. Wagonheim v. Maryland State Bd. of Censors, 255
Md. 297, 258 A.2d 240 (1969), aff'd by an equally divided court sub nom. Grove Press,
Inc. v. Maryland State Bd. of Censors, 401 U.S. 480 (1971).
'378 U.S. 184 (1964).
383 U.S. 413 (1966).
"Id. at 418. This test as enunciated by Justice Brennan received only the approval of
Chief Justice Warren and Justice Fortas. In a dissenting opinion Justice Clark observed
that the social value test was "novel" and that only three members of the Supreme Court
held to it. He further pointed out that, in his opinion, such a test rejects the Roth test to
which a majority of the Court did agree.
Even in Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967), the per curiam opinion was careful
to state that the necessity of meeting the 3-point test was a view held only by certain
Justices in Memoirs and did not cite the 3-point test as the test of the Court. However, it
is noted that in Roth the majority spoke of obscenity "as utterly without redeeming social
importance." 354 U.S. at 484-85.
7383 U.S. at 419.
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ity of the Court to agree on a definitive formulation of a test for
obscenity resulted in the repeated use of the approach developed
in Redrup v. New York in 1967.8 Justice Brennan notes that
"[n]o fewer than 31 cases"9 were disposed of by these "per
curiam reversals of convictions for the dissemination of materials
that at least five members of the Court, applying their separate
tests, deemed not to be obscene."'"
On June 21, 1973, the Supreme Court handed down the deci-
sion of Miller v. California," in which a majority of the Court-for
the first time since Roth-agreed on "concrete guidelines to iso-
late 'hard core' pornography from expression protected by the
First Amendment."' 2 First, the Court reaffirmed the basic tenet
of Roth that obscene material is not entitled to the protection of
the first amendment, but rejected the 3-part Memoirs test as a
constitutional standard.
Secondly, in acknowledging the power of the states to regu-
late obscenity, the Court delineated the following guidelines:
[W]e now confine the permissible scope of such regulation to works
which depict or describe sexual conduct. That conduct must be
specifically defined by the applicable state law .... A state offense
must also be limited to works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the
prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently
offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.14
Thirdly, the Court provided a sample instruction for the trier
of fact which incorporates the new standard as set forth above,
but noted that the state legislatures, not the Court, are to draft
'386 U.S. 767 (1967). See text accompanying notes 23-28 infra.
!Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2647 n.8 (1973).
"'Id. at 2647.
"93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973).
'Id. at 2617. The majority consisted of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun,
Powell, Rehnquist, and White.
1:1Id. at 2614. Note that the "utterly without redeeming social value" test is not
included in the new standard. Id. at 2615.
"Id. at 2614-15.
'1d. at 2615:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether the average
person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest [citations omitted]
* . . (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value.
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their own regulatory schemes.
Finally, the determination by the jury of what is obscene
under the new test is to be made not by the application of na-
tional standards, but rather by applying contemporary com-
munity standards as they exist in the forum community.' 7
One may question the clarity of the Miller decision and, even
in a moment of cynical hindsight, wonder whether the Court is
abdicating its responsibility of defining clearly the scope of the
first amendment. However, it seems certain that as a matter of
law the Miller test will remain constitutionally valid for some
time, and that the scope of protection to be afforded to allegedly
obscene material by the first amendment will be determined by
where the material is found.
B. The Average Person versus a Limited Class
The Miller decision, despite the formulation of a new test,
apparently has not altered the attitude of the Court toward the
appeal of obscene material to a limited class of people. In 1962,
the contention was advanced that the prurient interest element
could be evaluated on the basis of appeal to a particular class of
people, such as sexual deviates, and need not be determined on
the issue of appeal to the average person. However, in announcing
the judgment of the Court in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day,'"
Justice Harlan-joined by Justice Stewart-concluded that the
Court did not have to consider the issue of the proper audience
by which the prurient interest appeal should be judged, and the
case was decided instead on the issue of "patent offensiveness"
in connection with determining whether the offending material
exceeded contemporary community standards. 9
In 1966, the Supreme Court decided the issue raised in
Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day of whether prurient appeal could
be assessed on the basis of a limited audience, even though such
material might not appeal to the prurient interest of the average
"Id. at 2615.
17Id. at 2618-20. See text accompanying note 162 infra.
"370 U.S. 478 (1962).
"Id. at 486-91. Justice Harlan, elaborating upon this concept of "patent offensive-
ness" in connection with contemporary community standards, indicated that this test was
to be applied so as to determine whether the material goes substantially beyond the
customary limits of candor and decency which the community will tolerate in connection
with the representation or depiction of sexual matters, and that this evaluation must be
based on a national standard of decency, at least in connection with federal statute. Id.
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person. In Mishkin v. New York,2 a case involving publication of
books most of which depicted such deviations as sado-
masochism, fetishism, homosexuality, and drawings of scantily-
clad women being whipped, beaten, tortured, and abused, the
Court held:
Where the material is designed for and primarily disseminated
to a clearly defined deviant sexual group, rather than the public at
large, the prurient-appeal requirement of the Roth test is satisfied
if the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
the prurient interest in sex of the members of that group."
Although Miller has changed the thrust of the legal standard
for obscenity, it is clear that Mishkin, modified accordingly, will
still be constitutionally valid and will control with materials ap-
pealing to a limited audience.22
C. Distribution of Obscene Materials: From Redrup to Paris
Adult Theatre I
In 1966, the Supreme Court decided the case of Redrup v.
New York,2" the application of which caused much confusion
within the lower state and federal judiciaries, and among law
enforcement officials and prosecuting attorneys. In Redrup the
Court overturned the convictions of three distributors of allegedly
obscene books and magazines. The per curiam opinion noted that
2"383 U.S. 502 (1966).
2Ild. at 508.
2In Miller Chief Justice Burger, addressing himself to the issue of whether a national
community standard was required, stated:
People in different States vary in their tastes and attitudes, and this diver-
sity is not to be strangled by the absolutism of imposed uniformity. As the
Court made clear in Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508-09. . .(1966),
the primary concern with requiring a jury to apply the standard of "the
average person, applying community standards" is to be certain that, so far
as material is not aimed at a deviant group, it will be judged by its impact
on an average person, rather than a particularly susceptible or sensitive
person-or indeed a totally insensitive one.
93 S. Ct. at 2620.
In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. at 2634 n.6, the majority noted in dealing
with the need for expert testimony that:
We reserve judgment, however, on the extreme case, not presented here,
where contested materials are directed at such a bizarre deviant group that
the experience of the trier-of-fact would be plainly inadequate to judge
whether the material appeals to the prurient interests.
Here, the Court cited Mishkin and United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155, 167-68 (2d Cir.
1965). However, the Court held that in routine obscenity cases, expert testimony is not
required.




in none of the cases was there a claim that the statute in question
reflected a specific and limited concern for juveniles; in none was
there any suggestion of an assault upon individual privacy by
publication in a manner so obtrusive as to make it impossible for
an unwilling individual to avoid exposure to it; and in none was
there evidence of the sort of "pandering" which the court found
significant in Ginzburg v. United States." However, the Court
further noted that it had originally limited review in these three
cases to certain particularized questions upon the hypothesis that
the material involved in each case was of a character described
as "obscene in the constitutional sense" in Memoirs, but had
concluded that this hypothesis was invalid." After noting the
various views of the individual justices as to what constituted
obscenity, the Court concluded, "Whichever of these constitu-
tional views is brought to bear upon the cases before us, it is clear
that the judgments cannot stand."2 It is apparent that the Su-
preme Court did not reach the issues posed by its reference to the
concern for juveniles, intrusion upon the sensibilities of noncon-
senting adults, and pandering.
Redrup was interpreted by some courts as meaning that the
fact that a given publication is " 'obscene' no longer justifies sup-
pression or criminal prosecution unless it is pandered, obtrusively
advertised, or disseminated to unconsenting adults, or placed in
an environment in which it is likely to fall into the hands of
children. '27 Other courts took the position that the reference in
383 U.S. 463 (1966). In Ginzburg the Court indicated that a defendant's manner of
advertising sexually-oriented material could be considered in assessing prurient appeal
and redeeming social value. The Court also commented extensively about the defendant's
conduct in foisting these materials on an unwilling public.
-3 8 6 U.S. at 769-70. Review had been granted on the issue of scienter in two of the
cases and on the issue of "vagueness" and "prior restraint" of a comprehensive anti-
obscenity statute in the third case.
""Id. at 771.
"lHayse v. Van Hoomissen, 321 F. Supp. 642, 644 (D. Ore. 1970), vacated and re-
manded on juris. grounds, 403 U.S. 927 (1971).
In State v. Carlson, 202 N.W.2d 640 (Minn. 1972), the Minnesota Supreme Court,
after reviewing and analyzing some 29 obscenity convictions reversed by the United States
Supreme Court on the authority of Redrup, noted: "If any pattern has developed from
the decisions, it appears that hard-core pornography is outside of the scope of Redrup,
whatever its application is claimed to be." Id. at 646. Under this approach, Redrup has
significance only where the alleged obscenity does not rise to the level of hardcore pornog-
raphy. Then the supplemental standards of pandering, obtrusiveness, and exposure to
juveniles added by Redrup should be considered. State v. Lebewitz, 202 N.W.2d 648, 651
(Minn. 1972).
Another commentator has noted approximately 34 per curiam reversals of convictions
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Redrup to the concern for juveniles, intrusion upon the privacy
or sensibilities of nonconsenting adults, and pandering had no
significance and declined to interpret Redrup as a pronounce-
ment that all or any of these three matters must be shown before
an obscenity conviction can be sustained.25
In 1969 the Court held in Stanley v. Georgia9 that an individ-
ual could not be prosecuted for the mere possession of obscene
matter in the privacy of his own home. Redrup and Stanley were
subsequently combined by distributors of questionable material
to create the argument that if an adult may possess obscene mat-
ter for his personal use in the privacy of his home, he has the right
to receive such material, and therefore someone has the corre-
sponding right to distribute or sell it to him as long as he is a
consenting adult and there is no intrusion upon nonconsenting
adults, no distribution to juveniles, and no pandering. Based
upon this approach, it was quite routine for the argument to be
advanced that there is a right in a seller or distributor to make
obscene matter available commercially as long as the recipient is
a consenting adult. 0 It was also contended that obscene movies
may be shown in a commercial theater as long as juveniles are
excluded and only consenting adults patronize the exhibition."
On June 21, 1973, the Supreme Court held in Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton32 that the exhibition of obscene material (here,
films) in places of public accommodation may be regulated by the
by the Supreme Court since 1967 that cited Redrup as the ground for reversal. Reno,
Obscenit' Revisited-1972, 58 A.B.A.J. 736-37 (1972).
2'Johnson v. Commonwealth, 475 S.W.2d 893, 894-95 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971).
-"394 U.S. 557 (1969).
"Some courts accepted this argument. See, e.g., Hayse v. Van Hoomissen, 321 F.
Supp. 642 (D. Ore. 1970); United States v. Lethe, 312 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Cal. 1970);
Karalexis v. Byrne, 306 F. Supp. 1363 (D. Mass. 1969), vacated and remanded on juris.
grounds, 401 U.S. 216 (1971).
"In Slaton v. Paris Adult Theatre I, 228 Ga. 343, 185 S.E.2d 768 (1971), cert. granted,
408 U.S. 921 (1972), the theater exhibitors argued that they could commercially exhibit
obscene movies as long as minors were excluded and there was no obtrusive and indiscrim-
inate exhibition to nonconsenting adults. In People v. Kaplan, 23 Cal. App. 3d 9, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 372 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1972), cert. granted, 408 U.S. 921 (1972), the bookseller
claimed a derivative right of his customer, as a consenting adult, to purchase and read
what he chose and a corresponding right to make it available to him as long as there were
n( sales to minors nor any intrusions on the sensibilities of adults. Reference is also made
to the Redrup-Stanley issues in the briefs in Heller v. New York, 93 S. Ct. 2789 (1973),
involving the conviction of a theater exhibitor for the exhibition of a motion picture film,
Blue Movie. See People v. Heller, 29 N.Y.2d 319, 277 N.E.2d 651, 327 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1971),
cert. granted, 406 U.S. 916 (1972).
:193 S. Ct. 2628 (1973).
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states regardless of whether there is any pandering, obtrusive
advertising, or exposure to juveniles or nonconsenting adults. The
Court stated that the states have a legitimate interest in regulat-
ing the use of obscene material in local commerce and in all
places of accommodations because the interest involved includes
not only juveniles and nonconsenting adults, but also "the inter-
est of the public in the quality of life and the total community
environment . . . . ",31 Since the constitutional right of privacy
inherent in Stanley does not extend to places of public accommo-
dation such as a movie theater, the exhibition of the obscene
material is not entitled to protection under the first amendment.
34
D. The Zone of Constitutionally-Protected Privacy: Stanley
Restricted
The Court's decision in Stanley v. Georgia35 established the
doctrine that the individual's home and his actions within it-as
far as the possession of obscene materials is concerned-are
within the zone of privacy protected by the first amendment.
However, a series of decisions during the past 2 years have re-
stricted the range of this zone and certain alleged rights emanat-
ing therefrom.
In United States v. Reidel,6 the Court held that the right to
possess obscene materials did not imply the right to publish and
commercially distribute allegedly obscene matter through the
mails even to consenting adults, and reversed the district court's
dismissal of an indictment on the ground that Stanley required
the concomitant right to receive obscene materials for one's own
use and the right of another person to furnish obscene material
to such a recipient. 7
In United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs,31 the Court
held that the United States could regulate the possession and
importation of obscene materials through a port of entry into the
United States under its power to control foreign commerce, even
where the possession would be for one's own use, although Luros,
: Id. at 2635.
"Id. at 2639-40.
:"r394 U.S. 557 (1969).
:"-402 U.S. 351 (1971). This opinion appears to reflect the views of six Justices.
:'Id. at 355. See People v. Luros, 4 Cal. 3d 84, 480 P.2d 633, 92 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 824 (1972), in which the California Supreme Court, in a very
thorough opinion, arrived at the same conclusion as the United States Supreme Court had
in rejecting similar contentions in Reidel.
:"-402 U.S. 363 (1971).
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the possessor, had stipulated with the Government that the mate-
rials were imported for commercial purposes." Before the district
court, on the authority of Stanley, Luros had urged the trial court
to construe the first amendment as forbidding any restraints on
obscenity except where necessary to protect children or where
there was an actual intrusion into the privacy of an unwilling
adult. Without rejecting this position, the trial court read Stanley
as protecting, at the very least, the right to read obscene material
in the privacy of one's own home and to receive it for that pur-
pose, and thus concluded that the statute0 which barred the
importation of obscenity for private use as well as for commercial
distribution was overbroad and hence unconstitutional.4'
In Thirty-seven Photographs, Mr. Justice White commented
specifically:
The trial court erred in reading Stanley as immunizing from seizure
obscene materials possessed at a port of entry for the purpose of
importation for private use. 2
This limitation by the plurality opinion of the four Justices led
Mr. Justice Black, in his dissent (joined by Justice Douglas), to
respond:
Since the plurality opinion offers no plausible reason to distin-
guish private possession of "obscenity" from importation for private
use, I can only conclude that at least four members of the Court
would overrule Stanley. Or perhaps in the future that case will be
recognized as good law only when a man writes salacious books in
his attic, prints them in his basement, and reads them in his living
room."
These two decisions clearly indicated that the future of
Stanley was uncertain in that stricter views toward permitting
the sale and distribution of allegedly obscene matter would con-
strict even more the Stanley zone of privacy. Two recent Court
decisions have confined permissible possession "within the
home" to such an extent that in retrospect Justice Black's dissent
in Thirty-seven Photographs was accurate as well as prophetic.
:'lid. at 376-77. The plurality opinion reflected the views of four members of the Court:
Chief .Justice Burger; Mr. Justice White; Mr. Justice Brennan; and Mr. Justice Black-
mun. Justices Harlan and Stewart, relying on the stipulation of commercial use, con-
curred in the result and indicated that they would not.reach the issue of purely private
use.
'19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1970),
"United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 309 F. Supp. 36 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
' 402 U.S. at 376.
"Id. at 382.
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In United States v. Orito," the Court reaffirmed that the
zone of privacy that Stanley protects does not extend beyond the
home15 and held that under the commerce clause Congress can
regulate interstate transportation of obscene material by a pas-
senger on a common carrier even though such material is in-
tended for the passenger's private use." In United States v.
Twelve 200-foot Reels,47 the statute which was held unconstitu-
tional by a district court in United States v. Thirty-seven
Photographs" was upheld as constitutional. The Court stated
that Congress can regulate the importation of obscene matter,
notwithstanding the fact that the matter is intended solely for the
importer's private use and possession in his own home.49
These two decisions dispel any doubt that the Stanley zone
of privacy with regard to possession will ever extend beyond the
four walls of a private dwelling. The Supreme Court has re-
stricted the distribution of obscene materials in an indirect but
highly effective manner by narrowly limiting the holding in
Stanley to its facts and has thus provided both federal and state
governments with a great deal of freedom-within the confines of
Miller-to regulate the dissemination of allegedly obscene mate-
rial.
E. Speech versus Conduct: A Dilemma in the Law of Obscenity
In approaching the subject of whether given material is ob-
scene vel non, one must consider the medium utilized and
whether that medium partakes more of the expression and com-
munication of ideas and thoughts, or whether it presents conduct,
although that conduct ostensibly is meant to communicate an
idea or thought which is claimed to have first amendment protec-
tion. Thus the printed novel which depicts prostitution, adultery,
fornication, or other similar forms of conduct might be entitled
to constitutional protection, ° while the depiction or representa-
tion of that identical conduct on a stage or in a motion picture
might not be so protected.
'93 S. Ct. 2674 (1973).
"Id. at 2677.
'"Id. at 2678.
3793 S. Ct. 2665 (1973).
'"See notes 40-41 supra.
"93 S. Ct. at 2668-69.
"A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachu-
setts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). But see Kaplan v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2680 (1973).
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In California v. LaRue,'51 Mr. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for
the Court, observed:
[Als the mode of expression moves from the printed page to the
commission of public acts which may themselves violate valid penal
statutes, the scope of permissible state regulations significantly in-
creases. 2
Thus, it would appear that the performance of sexual intercourse
in public, whether real or simulated, whether live or on film,
whether thespian or not, should be held obscene,53 while a de-
scription of the same events in a novel or in story form, if not in
violation of the Miller test, should not be so held. However, the
recent decision of Kaplan v. California4 held:
Obscenity can . . . manifest itself in conduct, in the pictoral [sic]
representation of conduct, or in the written and oral description of
conduct."
The Court in Kaplan went on to hold that obscene material in
book form is not necessarily entitled to first amendment protec-
tion merely because it contains no pictures or diagrams.5 The
Kaplan decision obscures somewhat the delineation between
speech and conduct noted by Justice Rehnquist in LaRue and at
the same time offers no alternative method for distinguishing the
two concepts. 57
One of the more perplexing problems in this area is whether
motion pictures are to be evaluated with reference to portrayals
of sexual activities on the basis of expression of ideas and
thoughts, or whether they should be evaluated on the basis that
such activity constitutes "conduct." One of the most analytical
'1409 U.S. 109 (1972).
"Id. at 117.
See. e.g.. Bowling v. California, 12 CRm. L. Rem. 4027 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d App. Dist.,
filed Mar. 7, 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 912 (1972), in which the Supreme Court denied
review of a California Court of Appeals ruling which had held that a " 'live sex show'
including an act of intercourse is not a 'theatrical performance' excluded from the ambit
ol'the California Penal Code's prohibition against soliciting or engaging in lewd or disso-
lute conduct in lal place open to the public."
193 S. Ct. 268t1 (197:3).
M'Id. at 2684.
l"id.
It is clear, however, that, textual or printed material cannot be used as a "mere
vehicle" for presentation of sexually explicit illustrations and pictures, thus removing the
material from statutes regulating obscenity. See, e.g., State v. J-R Distributors, Inc., 512
P'.2d 1049, 10t78 (Wash. 1973). "A quotation from Voltaire in the flyleaf of a book will not
constitutionally redeem an otherwise obscene publication . Kois v. Wisconsin, 408
U.S. 229, 231 (1972).
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cases on this distinction is Trans-Lux Distributing Corp. v. Board
of Regents,5" in which the majority of the Court of Appeals for
New York, after a lengthy analysis of the distinction between
"speech" and "conduct," 59 concluded:
[A] filmed presentation of sexual intercourse, whether real or simu-
lated, is just as subject to state prohibition as similar conduct if
engaged in on the street. . . . [T]he nature of films is sufficiently
different from books to justify the conclusion that the critical differ-
ence between advocacy and actual performance of the forbidden act
is reached when simulated sexual intercourse is portrayed on the
screen."
_ 14 N.Y.2d 88, 198 N.E.2d 243, 248 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1964).
"'Id. at 91-92, 198 N.E.2d at 244-45, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 859-60 (citations omitted):
While typically applicable to "speech" and "press" in the forms known
to the framers, the guarantee of the First Amendment has been read to
include anything that is asserted to be someone's way of saying something.
The most familiar instances of this application are physical conduct and
motion pictures. . . .Cases involving conduct as a form of expression have
been frequent in labor law and provide a useful illustration of the transition
from a somewhat doctrinaire application of the First Amendment to a reali-
zation that, while conduct may be speech, it still remains conduct and does
not cease to present its unique problems of social control. It is now the law
that even peaceful picketing may be forbidden where it violates State labor
laws that are not themselves designed as restrictions on freedom of speech.
Conduct that is proscribed for valid public purposes is not immune merely
because engaged in with a view to expression. For example, in People v.
Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, 191 N.E.2d 272, supra, app. dsmd.
for want of a substantial Federal question 375 U.S. 42, 84 S. Ct. 147, 11
L.Ed.2d 107, this court upheld an "Aesthetic" ordinance prohibiting the
display of soiled laundry on a clothesline in the defendants' front yard,
despite the fact that the display was an expression of social protest.
Films, by their nature, may lie on either side of the division between
speech and conduct. The opinions of the Supreme Court reversing this court
in the cases of advocacy of adultery and thematic sacrilege make that plain.
But it also follows that if "picketing may include conduct other than speech,
conduct which can be made the subject of restrictive legislation" then so may
films. In this regard, it will be noted that the Supreme Court has not yet
expressed its opinion in a case involving allegedly obscene behavior on the
screen. In such a case, the First Amendment must be applied to films accord-
ing to their special nature, just as it has been applied to conduct. This much
has, of course, been explicitly recognized in the leading case on films and the
First Amendment: "Nor does it follow that motion pictures are necessarily
subject to the precise rules governing any other particular method of expres-
sion. Each method tends to present its own peculiar problems." (Joseph
Burstyn, Inc., v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503, 72 S.Ct. 777, 781, 96 L.Ed. 1098,
supra.)
See Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959), where the Court
"repeatedly distinguishes between the right to communicate any idea, however deviant
from orthodoxy, and the manner of its portrayal."
"'14 N.Y.2d at 92, 198 N.E.2d at 245, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 860. In connection with the
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If such portrayals of sexual intercourse, oral copulation, or
anal-genital contact have no relevance to a social value theme
which the film is endeavoring to communicate, and if they are
solely reproductions of sexual conduct aimed at titillating the
audience and arousing the viewers' sexual interests and desires,
it is difficult to conceive why the "conduct" rationale should not
be applied." In this context, it is significant to note that even
Justice Douglas has acknowledged that obscene conduct may be
prohibited. In his Roth dissent he stated:
I assume there is nothing in the Constitution which forbids
Congress from using its power over the mails to proscribe conduct
on the grounds of good morals. No one would suggest that the First
Amendment permits nudity in public places, adultery, and other
phases of sexual misconduct."
In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,63 the Court confined its
holding not to thoughts or speech, but to:
depiction and description of specifically defined sexual conduct that
States may regulate within limits designed to prevent infringement
of First Amendment rights."
However, in his dissent Mr. Justice Brennan pointed out that the
mere formulation of the Miller physical conduct test does not
resolve the difficulty of applying it to either pictorial or textual
material. 5 Indeed, the Court has yet to draw a clear line on what
type of conduct depicted in films is protected versus that which
is not protected. Mr. Justice Brennan's despair is apparent from
his statement:
Ultimately, the [Miller] reformulation must fail because it
still leaves in this Court the responsibility of determining in each
case whether the materials are protected by the First Amendment."
distinction between hooks and films, see United States v. A Motion Picture Film Entitled
1 Am Curious-Yellow", 404 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1968); McGrew v. City of Jackson, 307 F.
Supp. 754 (S.D. Miss. 1969); Landau v. Fording, 245 Cal. App. 2d 820, 54 Cal. Rptr. 177
(Dist. Ct. App. 1966), a/f'd, 388 U.S. 456 (1967); Wagonheim v. State Bd. of Censors, 255
Md. 297, 258 A.2d 240 (1969), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 401 U.S. 480 (1971).
"'See, e.g., State v. Lebewitz, 202 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. 1972), in which the Minnesota
Supreme Court upheld the conviction of two theater owners for exhibiting an obscene
motion picture entitled The Art of Marriage, which the exhibitors claimed had the
effect of a cinematic marriage manual. The film explicitly portrayed heterosexual inter-
course, frequently of prolonged duration. The Court held that the guise of educational
value was a mere pretense to commercially exploit its prurient appeal.
"2354 U.S. 476, 512 (1957).





Prior to the recent decisions in Miller and its companion
cases, the Court refused to find obscenity in films involving mere
suggestion of sexual activity67 or in those with sexual episodes
which, though explicit, were "so fragmentary and fleeting that
only a censor's alert would make an audience conscious that
something 'questionable' is being portrayed." 8 On the other
hand, a conviction was left standing where the film portrayed
explicit "sexual activity" which included deviant conduct or oral
copulation and sodomy as well as fantasies of sexual intercourse. 9
In connection with still photographs and photographic publica-
tions and magazines, the Supreme Court has refused to upset
findings of obscenity where the photographs depicted overt sexual
activity, parties engaged in sexual intercourse, and unnatural and
deviant sexual practices."
Since the case was remanded in Paris Adult Theatre I, it is
difficult to predict how a jury will apply the Miller and Paris tests
to any given film. It is possible that the film Deep Throat may
very well not withstand the new obscenity test,7 but there are still
lacking some definitive and precise guidelines as to exactly what
types of portrayals of sexual matters in motion pictures, as well
as in books and other types of publications, should be prohibited.
11. FIRST AND FOURTH AMENDMENT PROBLEMS
As if the perplexing and vexatious problems associated with
defining obscenity were not enough, the law of obscenity as it
developed during the past decade brought forth other and even
more frustrating problems for the lower level judiciary in both
federal and state courts. These problems centered around certain
procedural issues, such as whether a prior adversary hearing to
determine the obscenity of the questioned material was constitu-
tionally required before a judicial officer could issue a search
warrant in connection with an alleged obscenity criminal offense,
"Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 355 U.S. 35, revg 244 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1957).
"Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197-98 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
"Landau v. Fording, 388 U.S. 456 (1967), afJ'g 245 Cal. App. 2d 280, 54 Cal. Rptr.
177 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
7
1Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966) (publications depicting sadomasochism,
fetishism, homosexuality, and drawings of scantily-clad women being whipped, beaten,
tortured, or abused); Levin v. State, 1 Md. App. 139, 228 A.2d 487 (Ct. App. 1967), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968); Phelper v. State, 396 S.W.2d 396 (Crim. App. Tex. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 943 (1965).
'7See Judge Tyler's opinion in People v. Mature Enterprises, 41 U.S.L.W. 2498 (N.Y.
City Crim. Ct., filed Mar. 1, 1973). See also United States v. One Reel of Film, 481 F.2d
207 (1st Cir. 1973) (holding Deep Throat obscene under 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a)).
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or before there could be an arrest by a law enforcement official,
with or without a warrant or, in the case of a warrantless arrest,
prior to the incidental seizure of allegedly obscene materials. In
addition, the first amendment ramifications of obscenity cases
required the development of different standards for determining
probable cause in the issuance of warrants for a search or arrest.
The response to these problems was a plethora of conflicting deci-
sions demonstrating an overriding need for the Supreme Court to
provide some definitive and meaningful guidance.
Just 4 days after the decisions in Miller and its companion
cases were announced, the Supreme Court handed down two
opinions involving the issue of a prior adversary hearing and the
requirement for a search warrant to be issued prior to the seizure
of allegedly obscene materials." The following sections examine
the extent to which the procedural aspects of obscenity prosecu-
tions have been settled and raise questions about those situations
which remain unresolved.
A. The Adversary Hearing Prior to Seizure
The genesis of the prior adversary hearing seems to have been
in Marcus v. Search Warrant,73 and the concept was further de-
veloped in the plurality opinion of four Justices in A Quantity of
Books v. Kansas.74 In Marcus the discussion of the idea of an
adversary hearing prior to the issuance of a search warrant was
actually dictum, for the Court, in the final analysis, stated:
Putting to one side the fact that no opportunity was afforded the
appellants to elicit and contest the reasons for the officer's belief,
or otherwise to argue against the propriety of the seizure to the
issuing judge, still the warrants [were] issued on the strength of the
conclusory assertions of a single police officer, without any scrutiny
by the judge of any materials considered by the complainant to be
obscene."
It thus appears that the decision in Marcus was in reality
based on traditional fourth amendment grounds, i.e., the failure
of the affidavit to set forth sufficiently detailed factual informa-
tion for the judge to make an independent judgment of probable
cause. 76
7'Heller v. New York, 93 S. Ct. 2789 (1973); Roaden v. Kentucky, 93 S. Ct. 2796
(1973).
7367 U.S. 717 (1961).
;'378 U.S. 205 (1964).
7 367 U.S. at 731-32 (emphasis added).
"For a similar analysis of the Marcus opinion, see State v. Eros Cinema, Inc., 264
1974
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A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, involving the seizure of some
1,715 copies of 31 titles of various publications for purposes of
destruction in a civil proceeding upon a search warrant, became
the judicial vehicle which brought the concept of a prior adver-
sary hearing firmly into the law." The Court's opinion caused so
much confusion as to the occasions which require an adversary
hearing that state and lower federal court decisions which dealt
with this case produced conflicting applications of the rule. One
state court interpreted the holding in Quantity of Books in this
manner:
This opinion of four members of the Supreme Court, two of
whom no longer sit, is authority only for the proposition that total
suppression of any expression of speech or press as obscenity cannot
be had except after an adversary hearing. The repeated mention of
the mass seizure of all copies of all titles clearly points to the alterna-
tive the majority felt was available in the control of obscenity-that
is, the seizure of one copy of each title for evidence to determine
whether all copies may be suppressed as obscene."
So. 2d 615 (La. 1972).
Marcus involved the seizure of 11,000 copies of some 280 different publications pur-
suant to a search warrant for purposes of destroying or burning them to suppress their
contents in a civil proceeding. In the course of the opinion, the Court noted that the
regulation of obscenity must conform to procedures that will ensure against the curtail-
ment of constitutionally protected expression, which is often separated from obscenity by
"a dim and uncertain line," citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963).
The Court also noted that the separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for
"sensitive tools," citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958), and that the Consti-
tution requires a procedure "designed to focus searchingly on the question of obscenity."
Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 731-32 (1961).
See also Note, The Prior Adversary Hearing: Solution to Procedural Due Process
Problems in Obscenity Seizures?, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 80 (1971).
71'he plurality opinion was by Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Warren
and Justices White and Goldberg.
Mr. Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion, noted, "If this case involved hard-core
pornography, I think the procedures which were followed would be constitutionally valid,
at least with respect to the material which the judge 'scrutinized.' " 378 U.S. at 214. The
opinion discloses that the judge who issued the search warrant had conducted a 45-minute
ex parte inquiry during which he "scrutinized" several books prior to issuing the warrant
{or 59 novels by title, and concluded that those scrutinized and others published by the
same publisher (the latter based on their titles) gave him reason to believe that all were
obscene. Upon execution of the warrant on the same day, only 31 of the titles were actually
seized.
Justices Black and Douglas concurred on the grounds that the first amendment
precluded state regulation of obscene matter and indicated that Roth should be overruled.
Justices Harlan and Clark indicated that they would affirm the procedures utilized and
the judgment of the Kansas Supreme Court.
"State v. Eros Cinema, Inc., 264 So. 2d 615, 618 (La. 1972). See Heller v. New York,
93 S. Ct. 2789, 2794 (1973), in which the Supreme Court approved this interpretation.
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A number of federal courts have held, however, that Quantity of
Books dictates that a pre-seizure adversary hearing is required
before a search warrant can ever be issued and executed. The
leading cases, both of which involved films, are Tyrone, Inc. v.
Wilkinson" and Bethview Amusement Corp. v. Cahn."0
One of the most analytical opinions holding that no pre-
seizure adversary hearing is required is Bazzell v. Gibbens.51 In
Bazzell the court commenced its analysis with the observation
that whether a pre-seizure adversary hearing is required "must
depend upon the nature and purpose of the seizure."82 The court
held that a single copy seizure of a motion picture film for the sole
purpose of preserving it as evidence was valid without a pre-
seizure adversary hearing prior to the issuance of the search war-
rant, albeit a side effect coincidentally prevents that copy from
being further disseminated pending the outcome of the criminal
prosecution." The court further noted:
To deprive the District Attorney . . . of the right to seize evidence
pursuant to a search warrant issued on the basis of probable cause,
and to preserve that evidence intact for use during future criminal
proceedings, would be to effectively deny the State the right in a
case such as this to prosecute at all under a statute already declared
to be constitutional. . . . Surely such a procedure would not have
offended. . . freedom of expression. It would merely have prevented
the possible destruction or disappearance of the evidence. .... .1
The Louisiana Supreme Court, when faced with the identical
issue in State v. Eros Cinema, Inc.,"5 stated:
[To hold to the contrary would be ridiculous. . . . [for] the best
evidence . . . is the allegedly obscene material. Unless such mate-
rial can be purchased . . . the only lawful means in cases such as
this for producing and preserving this evidence is under search and
7"410 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 985 (1969).
416 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970). See also United States
v. Alexander, 428 F.2d 1169 (8th Cir. 1970); Astro Cinema Corp. v. Mackell, 422 F.2d 293
(2d Cir. 1970); Fontaine v. Dial, 303 F. Supp. 436 (W.D. Tex. 1969), appeal dismissed,
399 U.S. 521 (1970). For an illustrative state case taking the same position, see State ex.
rel. McDevitt v. Harvey, 491 P.2d 563 (Colo. 1971).
'"306 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. La. 1969).
I"Id. at 1059.
1d.
"Id. at 1060. Accord, Scott v. Frey, 330 F. Supp. 365, 368 (E.D. La. 1971), observing
that to order return of the films seized while state criminal prosecutions are pending would
be almost unwarranted interference with the orderly procedure and operation of the state
criminal process. Compare Cinema Classics, Ltd. v. Busch, 339 F. Supp. 43 (C.D. Cal.
1972).
'264 So. 2d 615 (La. 1972).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
seizure which comply with the Fourth Amendment requirements for
a valid search warrant."
In People v. Heller,"7 the Court of Appeals for New York
stated that the decisions of the Second Circuit in Astro Cinema
Corp., Inc. v. Mackell" and Bethuiew Amusement Corp. v.
Cahn,85 requiring adversary hearings before search warrants can
issue for the seizure of a single copy of an allegedly obscene mo-
tion picture film, went beyond any requirement imposed on state
courts by the United States Supreme Court and that New York
was not required to follow them."' On appeal, in Heller v. New
York," the Supreme Court upheld this position and therefore
rejected the requirement of a prior adversary hearing before the
"I'd. at 619.
729 N.Y.2d 319, 277 N.E.2d 651, 327 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1971).
'1422 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1970). For a more recent case dealing with the procedures in
the Second Circuit, see Perial Amusement Corp. v. Morse, 482 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1973),
decided .June 1, 1973, which also explicitly upholds the power and authority of the United
States Magistrate to conduct the adversary hearing.
"416 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1969).
"'See People v. DeRenzy, 275 Cal. App. 2d 380, 382, 79 Cal. Rptr. 777, 778 (Ct. App.
1969). In referring to DeRenzy's reliance on Metzger v. Pearcy, 393 F.2d 202 (7th Cir.
1968), the court noted that "Jolf course, although such a decision of a United States
Court olf Appeals is entitled to great respect, we are not bound thereby, even on questions
relating to the federal Constitution." For other cases dealing with this issue, see United
States v. Gower, 116 F. Supp. 1390 (D.D.C. 1970); United States v. Pryba, 312 F. Supp.
466 (D.l).C. 1970); People v. Steinberg, 60 Misc. 2d 1041, 304 N.Y.S.2d 858 (Westchester
County Ct. 1969).
The Pryba case involved allegedly obscene stag films and other materials being
shipped in interstate commerce observed by an airline employee during the course of
shipment. Based on information obtained from that employee, a search warrant was
issued. Because of the furtive manner in which the package was being shipped, the court
held that no pre-seizure adversary hearing was required. The court noted that law enforce-
ment officials should not he required to make futile gestures in attempting to set up an
adversary hearing and to have the prospective defendant produce the offending material.
The court further observed that to believe the same films would be proffered to the court
in the same condition as when first viewed by the airline employee would be to blink at
reality. Contra, United States v. Alexander, 428 F.2d 1169 (8th Cir. 1970).
See also Kaplan v. United States, 277 A.2d 477 (D.C. App. 1971), holding that no
adversary hearing was required prior to the issuance of a search warrant to seize a 12-
minute film in a peepshow machine: "Law enforcement officials have no right to require
the operator to bring the machine to court and the court has no reason to go to the
machine." Id. at 480. In Vali Books, Inc. v. Murphy, 343 F. Supp. 841, 844 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), involving the seizures of peepshow films both incident to arrests without warrants
and pursuant to a search warrant without a prior adversary hearing, the court held that
the seizure of a few samples to be used as evidence does not become illegal absent a prior
adversary hearing, but that the indiscriminate seizure of such film without regard to the
charge on which the arrests were made or unrelated to the basis for the issuance of a search
warrant is illegal.
"'9:3 S. Ct. 2789 (1973).
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seizure under a warrant of a single copy of a film for evidentiary
use in the exhibitor's obscenity trial. However, the Court reaf-
firmed the holdings in Marcus and A Quantity of Books requiring
an adversary hearing prior to the seizure of a large quantity of
books for the sole purpose of their destruction, '2 and also reaf-
firmed the rule announced in United States v. Thirty-seven
Photographs3 and Freedman v. Maryland94 requiring an adver-
sary hearing prior to imposing a "final restraint" on any obscene
materials."' The rationale of the Marcus and Quantity of Books
doctrine was based on the "danger of abridgment of the right of
the public in a free society to unobstructed circulation of non-
obscene books."" For that reason the Court also dictated that in
the case of the seizure of a single copy of a film, as in Heller,
copying of the seized film shall be permitted if necessary to en-
sure its continued exhibition during the legal proceedings."
The holding in Heller must be limited to its facts. The case
involved the seizure of a single evidentiary copy of an allegedly
obscene film based on a warrant issued after a neutral magis-
trate's determination of probable obscenity. Additionally, the
Heller opinion requires a prompt judicial determination of ob-
scenity following a "fully adversary" trial. 8 Nevertheless, Heller
appears to be the definitive decision on this single copy issue, for
one may presume that Heller will also apply where allegedly ob-
scene books and/or photographs are involved.
B. The Adversary Hearing Prior to Arrest
The interpretation and application of the Quantity of Books
rule has resulted in mass confusion and chaos in law enforcement
procedures for initiating criminal prosecutions of obscenity viola-
tions. Cases can be found supporting almost any proposition
"'Id. at 2794.
'"'402 U.S. 363 (1971).
"'380 U.S. 51 (1965).
' 93 S. Ct. at 2793.
"A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 213 (1964).
'93 S. Ct. at 2795. See also Perial Amusement Corp. v. Morse, 482 F.2d 515, 523 n.9
(2d Cir. 1973).
'The determination in Heller took 48 days due to the failure of petitioner to request
expeditious judicial consideration of the obscenity issue. Heller v. New York, 93 S. Ct.
2789, 2793-94 (1973).
'"'The action of federal district courts in considering and granting injunctions against
state criminal prosecutions because no pre-seizure adversary hearing was conducted be-
lore the seizure of alleged obscene materials, and in some cases ordering the suppression
of the material, may have in some instances resulted in exacerbating the relations between
1974
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which might be advanced. For instance, in Delta Book Distribu-
tors, Inc. v. Cronvich'"" a 2-judge majority of a 3-judge district
court held that an adversary hearing was necessary prior to an
arrest, even where the allegedly obscene material had been pur-
chased by law enforcement officials. The court noted:
Since prior restraint upon the exercise of First Amendment
rights can be exerted through seizure (with or without a warrant) of
the allegedly offensive materials, arrest (with or without a warrant)
of the alleged offender or through the threat of either or both seizure
and arrest, the conclusion is irresistible in logic and in law that none
of these may be constitutionally undertaken prior to an adversary
judicial determination of obscenity.'"'
The majority also suggested that distributors and exhibitors
should be given immunity from prosecution for conduct engaged
in prior to the determination of obscenity at an adversary hearing
and that they could be subjected to criminal prosecution only for
subsequent dissemination which occurs after the finding of ob-
scenity at such a hearing."2 To this, Judge Rubin responded in
dissent:
It is no longer an acceptable proposition in tort law that a dog
is entitled to one free bite; there should be no rule in criminal
law-even by virtue of the protection accorded to freedom of
speech-that every peddler of pornography is entitled to one free
essay at scatology."
'3
It would appear that two recent decisions by the Supreme
local lederal district and state courts. In some cases, however, in ordering the return of
the seized materials minus samples, the federal courts have not enjoined the state criminal
prosecution. In other cases, e.g., Tyrone, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 410 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 985 (1969), while requiring a sample to be furnished to the prosecu-
tion, the court has expressly declined to comment on the admissability of the evidence in
the state criminal prosecution.
"'304 F. Supp. 662 (M.D. La. 1969), rev'd in part on juris. grounds sub nor. Perez v.
Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971). See also City News Center, Inc. v. Carson, 298 F. Supp. 706
(N.D. Fla. 1969).
""304 F. Supp. at 667.
""0This immunity theory was also espoused in Sokolic v. Ryan, 304 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.
Ga. 1969). The court there stated that any criminal prosecution prior to an adversary
hearing and without the distributor's having a subsequent opportunity to refrain from
selling the materials determined to be obscene would be a violation of his first amendment
rights. Id. at 216.
Such a procedure would be equivalent to giving distributors and film exhibitors
advisory opinions, since if they declined to sell the offending materials or exhibit the
motion picture film in question thereafter, no criminal prosecution would result. This is
not the normal role of the judiciary. See State v. Shackman, 29 Ohio Misc. 56, 278 N.E.2d
61 (Franklin County Mun. Ct. 1971).
"'304 F. Supp. at 674.
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Court should have laid to rest the notion that a prospective defen-
dant is entitled to an adversary hearing even prior to an arrest
for an obscenity violation, even where there is no seizure inciden-
tal to the arrest. In Milky Way Productions, Inc. v. Leary"" it had
been argued that an arrest could be as effective a chilling influ-
ence or restraint as a seizure of obscene material."' On appeal the
Supreme Court affirmed per curiam the district court decision
which had held that an adversary hearing was not required before
an arrest made pursuant to a constitutional state obscenity stat-
ute not involving a seizure of material.""6 In Gable v. Jenkins, 1
7
it was contended that the Georgia statute was unconstitutional
in that it did not provide for a prior judicial hearing before an
arrest."" The Supreme Court affirmed the disposition by the dis-
trict court which rejected this contention.""'
C. Adversary Hearing Prior to a Seizure Incident to Arrest
A much more substantial argument has been made that dis-
tributors and exhibitors have a right to a pre-seizure adversary
hearing in those cases involving the seizure of allegedly obscene
materials, publications, and motion picture films incident to a
warrantless arrest. A substantial number of courts have accepted
this argument. In Bongiovanni v. Hogan, "" the court stated that
it was difficult to perceive why seizure in a civil instead of a
criminal case, or by the federal rather than a state government,
or incidental to an arrest rather than by use of a warrant, would
alter the impermissible "chilling effect" of first amendment free-
doms which results from seizure without a prior adversary hear-
ing.I ' The court further noted that the government "cannot make
a 'chilling' seizure permissible by removing the label of a search
warrant and pasting on that of seizure incidental to a lawful
arrest." 12 In Entertainment Ventures, Inc. v. Brewer,13 the court
observed that to permit a warrantless seizure would make an
'"305 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
"Id. at 290.
'""New York Feed Co., Inc. v. Leary, 397 U.S. 98 (1970). See also United States v.
Fragus, 428 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1970).
'"7309 F. Supp. 998 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
""Id. at 1001.
'""Gable v. Jenkins, 397 U.S. 592 (1970).
""309 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
"Id. at 1366.
"'d.
":306 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Ala. 1969).
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officer rather than a judge the arbiter of what is obscene."4
Perhaps the best reply to this line of reasoning is that set
forth in Rage Books, Inc. v. Leary."' The court there observed
that no adversary hearing is required when law enforcement offi-
cials are engaged in the normal function of effecting an arrest,
and when the seizure is of a sample of the evidence necessary for
the prosecution of the suspected crime being committed in the
officer's presence." ' The court further observed that in such cir-
cumstances such a seizure is not tantamount to a prior restraint,
since the restraint is essentially the restraint of the obscenity law
itself." '7 Thus, the existence of the criminal statute proscribing
the distribution of the obscene matter, and not the incidental
seizure of evidence in connection with an arrest for a violation of
that statute, was viewed as the restraint.
In Cambist Films, Inc. v. Duggan,"8 the district court indi-
cated that a "motion picture film itself is perhaps the best evi-
dence, or at least indispensable evidence, on the question as to
its nature . ... "'I The court further noted that films are often
cut or altered for showing at different theaters. Observing that it
is important (for the prosecution) to establish the exact content
of the film as exhibited on the occasion giving rise to the prosecu-
tion, the court concluded that it was thus necessary that law
enforcement officials be allowed to seize a single copy at the time
"'Id. at 809. Based on a similar approach and reasoning, the California Supreme
Court has required that absent an emergency involving a high probability that the evi-
dence may be lost, destroyed, or spirited away, all seizures must be pursuant to a search
warrant and not incident to a warrantless arrest. Flack v. Municipal Court, 66 Cal. 2d
981, 429 P.2d 192, 59 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1967).
Note also the views of Justice Brown of the Ohio Supreme Court, in dissent, in State
v. Albini, 31 Ohio St. 2d 27, 34, 285 N.E.2d 327, 332 (1972):
The holding of the majority today constitutes an unlawful delegation to
the police of the plenary duty of the courts to so determine whether there is
probable cause to believe the films obscene after all parties have had an
opportunity to express and present [their arguments]. ...
Although the seizure of the films in question was incident to an arrest,
the arrest itself-and hence the seizure-is invalid. In the absence of a prior
judicial hearing to determine probable cause to believe the films obscene, the
arrest is the product of the unlawful delegation of authority.
See also Cambist Films, Inc. v. Duggan, 420 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1969) and Metzger v.
Pearcy, 393 F.2d 202 (7th Cir. 1968), both requiring a pre-seizure adversary hearing prior
to a seizure incident to a warrantless arrest.




"'298 F. Supp. 1148 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
"'Id. at 1152 n.4.
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of the arrest without a prior adversary hearing.2 " Notwithstand-
ing these cogent observations, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the district court.'2 '
To require that a motion picture film be brought into court
for a showing at an adversary hearing prior to seizure provides no
guarantee against cutting, alteration, or substitution between the
time of the notice and actual production, or the prehearing ship-
ment of the film out of the jurisdiction of the court.'22 Testimonial
evidence as to the content of a motion picture may well not suffice
since it is the factfinder who must apply the Miller test. The
judge or the jury must determine if the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, depicts or
describes in a patently offensive way sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law, and, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.'23 Arguably,
no factfinder could adequately make such a judgment without
viewing the entire motion picture film-oral statements of wit-
nesses describing segments are not sufficient. It could also be
contended that without the material before the judge it would be
impossible to know whether the Miller test had been correctly
applied,' although the test at the initial adversary hearing is
'1d.
121420 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1969).
'22See Hosey v. City of Jackson, 309 F. Supp. 527, 534-35 (S.D. Miss. 1970), where
the court speaks not only of alteration of motion picture films, but also of shipping such
films to another theater or location while an attempt is being made to set up an adversary
hearing.
It is further noted that theater exhibitors frequently lease their films from a distribu-
tor with a firm return date in the contract, and they could assert, after receiving notice of
an adversary hearing to be held at some future date, that they have returned the film to
the distributor pursuant to their contract obligation.
See also Crecilius v. Commonwealth, 14 CRiM. L. RPrR. 2133 (Ky. Ct. App., filed Oct.
10, 1973), where it was held that a court could not order an exhibitor to reclaim and submit
an allegedly obscene motion picture, and that forcing a potential defendant to be an agent
for the police in securing a copy of the evidence that may be used to convict him raised
grave constitutional issues concerning the fifth amendment. See also Perial Amusement
Corp. v. Morse, 482 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1973).
"W3Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2614-15 (1973). However, see Perial Amusement
Corp. v. Morse, 482 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1973), for determination of obscenity at adversary
hearing without considering the motion picture film itself.
"'2 n Bryers v. State, 480 S.W.2d 712, 718 (Crim. App. Tex. 1972), the court reversed
an obscenity conviction based upon testimonial evidence and stated:
In conclusion, we hold that the evidence is insufficient to sustain an obscen-
ity conviction unless (1) the alleged obscene matter, in this case a film, is
introduced into evidence or (2) the defendant expressly and affirmatively
stipulates or admits that the material is obscene. . ..
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probable obscenity and not proof of obscenity beyond a reasona-
ble doubt.'25
It has also been asserted that police officers not only have the
right but also the duty to seize evidence which was the very
means or vehicle of the commission of a crime committed in the
officer's presence, and that to prohibit the seizure of such evi-
dence under these circumstances would completely frustrate
criminal prosecution and necessarily the arrest for a crime wit-
nessed by the arresting officers.' 26 To require a pre-seizure adver-
sary hearing before there can be a seizure of publications or of a
motion picture film incident to an arrest would be to carve out a
unique exception to the traditional law of arrest, for it would
require the courts to engage in the executive function of deciding
when an arrest or an arrest and incidental seizure should be
made, thus in effect rendering advisory opinions to both the
prosecutor and the prospective defendant.
A canvass and review of the reported decisions discloses that
while a substantial number of federal courts required an adver-
sary hearing prior to a seizure of allegedly obscene materials inci-
dent to an arrest, the majority of state courts did not.'2
In Longoria v. State, 479 S.W.2d 689 (Crim. App. Tex. 1972), the court reversed a jury
conviction for obscenity on the grounds that the testimony of two officers describing the
contents of the motion picture films was insufficient evidence for the jury, or the appellate
court, independently, to determine obscenity.
However, in People v. Goulet, 21 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 98 Cal. Rptr. 782 (Super. Ct.
App. Dep't 1971), the appellate court reversed the dismissal of charges by a municipal
court judge on the ground that the prosecutor did not have the actual films to exhibit to
the jury. While the appellate court indicated that secondary evidence could be received,
it did acknowledge that "there may be cases where it is difficult to establish the contents
of a film or book by oral secondary showings, particularly where its obscenity may be
borderline in character." Id. at 4, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 784.
The nature of appellate review required in obscenity cases further fortifies the conclu-
sion that the actual allegedly obscene material is indispensable evidence in a criminal
prosecution. In State v. Carlson the Minnesota Supreme Court felt obliged to reverse some
of the convictions because the allegedly obscene material involved was missing from the
appellate record and the court could not fulfill its obligation under Jacobellis v. Ohio to
make its own independent review of the facts. 202 N.W.2d 640, 647 (Minn. 1972).
"'See Perial Amusement Corp. v. Morse, 482 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1973).
"'Hosey v. City of Jackson, 309 F. Supp. 527, 534 n.9 (S.D. Miss. 1970), vacated and
remanded on juris. grounds, 401 U.S. 987 (1971).
'27See also Note, Prior Adversary Hearings on the Question of Obscenity, 70 COLUM.
L. REV. 1403, 1416 n.79 (1970), and cases cited therein.
Some federal courts have also declined to require a pre-seizure adversary hearing in
cases not involving the seizure of motion picture films. In United States v. Cangiano, 464
F.2d 320, 326 (2d Cir. 1972), the court took the position that samples of allegedly obscene
reels of 8-millimeter film, playing cards, books, magazines, and photographs could prop-
erly be seized incident to an arrest without a pre-seizure adversary hearing. In United
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On June 23, 1973, the Supreme Court removed the seizure of
allegedly obscene materials from the "incident to arrest" excep-
tion. In Roaden v. Kentucky,128 the Court held that books and
films could not be seized without the authority of a constitution-
ally valid warrant "because prior restraint of the right of expres-
sion, whether by books or film, calls for a higher hurdle in the
evaluation of reasonableness. ' 129 The clear implication of Roaden
is that there should be no seizure of allegedly obscene material
without the benefit of a search warrant based on an affidavit
which affords a judge an ample opportunity to focus searchingly
on the issue of obscenity. The rationale of Roaden is that seizures
incident to a warrantless arrest would afford less protection to
first amendment rights than seizures based on conclusory affida-
vits and would be made solely on the individual evaluation of the
seizing law enforcement officer or of the prosecutor who advises
him. The majority in Roaden made it unmistakably clear that
even the limited prior restraint involved in such seizures based
on the personal predilections and value judgments of individual
law enforcement officials, often overzealous in their efforts
against alleged pornography, imposed too great a burden on first
amendment freedoms, and that the impartiality, objectivity, and
independence of judges are a sine qua non to a valid seizure.
Predicated upon a higher standard of "reasonableness" because
of such considerations under the fourth amendment, such a re-
quirement will impose a much more substantial demand upon
judges in the issuance of search warrants in this area of the law.
Law enforcement officials in a situation such as that in
Roaden-the showing of an allegedly obscene motion picture film
at an outdoor theater-will have to proceed according to one of
two alternatives. They must obtain a search warrant prior to
States v. Wild, 422 F.2d 34, 37-38 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 987 (1971), the
court stated that a prior adversary hearing was not required where, after a lawful arrest,
a few samples of allegedly obscene color slides, photographs, some reels of stag-type films,
and other materials were seized as evidence for a subsequent prosecution, where such
seizure did not substantially restrain distribution of the material involved. The court
specifically stated that A Quantity of Books and Marcus were "inapposite since they
involved massive seizures of books under state statutes which authorized warrants for the
seizure of obscene materials as a first step in civil proceedings seeking their destruction."
The court also distinguished its earlier decision of Bethview Amusement Corp. v. Cahn,
416 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970), involving a motion picture
film exhibited in a public theatre, as it had equated the seizure of such a film, which could
be viewed by as many as 4,000 people in a week, with a massive seizure of books.
'293 S. Ct. 2796 (1973).
"Id. at 2801.
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making an arrest, either with or without an arrest warrant, or
after making a warrantless arrest they must refrain from seizing
the offending material until a search warrant has been ob-
tained. 3 " Whether Roaden will permit any exception based on a
clear and convincing showing of necessity to make a seizure with-
out benefit of a warrant-such as where a warrantless arrest is
made and any delay to obtain a search warrant would permit the
destruction of the allegedly obscene material or the removal of it
beyond the jurisdiction of the court-remains to be seen. It ap-
pears that courts faced with such a situation based on a strong
factual record showing such an emergency or exigent circumstan-
ces could distinguish Roaden and uphold a seizure incident to a
warrantless arrest in this very narrow and limited situation. Even
then the combination of Heller and Roaden would apparently
require a prompt post-seizure adversary hearing as soon as all
interested parties could be notified and the court could schedule
such a hearing.
D. Application of Fourth Amendment Standards
Although the Supreme Court in Heller v. New York has held
that the seizure of a minimal number of copies of publications or
of a single copy of motion picture film can be accomplished with-
out a pre-seizure adversary hearing, the requirement of a warrant
announced in Roaden v. Kentucky means that a magistrate or
judge must still be very careful to ensure that basic fourth
amendment requirements are met in the affidavit submitted in
support of the search warrant application. It appears to be uni-
versally accepted that since first amendment ramifications are
involved, a more stringent standard of probable cause is justified
in obscenity cases.' 3' An application to seize allegedly obscene
""See Crecelius v. Commonwealth, 14 CRIM. L. RPTE. 2133 (Ky. Ct. App., filed Oct.
26, 1973); Kansas City v. O'Conner, 14 CraM. L. Rrm. 2161 (Mo., filed Oct. 8, 1973).
Indeed, in Kansas City v. O'Conner, Justice Seiler, in dissent, raised the question of
whether, absent exigent circumstances which indicate that seizure of allegedly obscene
material for preservation as evidence is a "now or never" situation, seizure even pursuant
to a search warrant is only permissible after some type of hearing on the issue of obscenity.
He suggests that the hearing can be a prior adversary hearing to determine obscenity or
an ex parte hearing.
This view appears to impose more than required by Heller as long as there is a
sufficiently detailed factual affidavit, although a United States Magistrate or a state judge
could supplement the affidavit by taking ex parte testimony under oath from the affiant
and/or other witnesses. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c).
3 See, e.g., United States v. Santiago, 424 F.2d 1047, 1048 (1st Cir. 1970), which
speaks in terms of a "particularly strong showing" being required to "justify a search for
matter prima facie entitled to the special protection of the First Amendment."
VOL. 51
OBSCENITY: SEARCH AND SEIZURE
books, magazines, or other publications, or stag or motion picture
films cannot be treated in the same manner as an application for
a warrant to search for narcotics, adulterated foods, gambling
paraphernalia, stolen goods, burglar tools, and other normal
types of contraband or evidence of a crime.'32
Judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and officials involved
in law enforcement must be more than merely knowledgeable
about the general theory of and the justification for the laws
regulating obscenity. They must come to grips with the problem
of applying the obscenity test enunciated in Miller v. California.
This task is especially complicated and demanding for those
judges who issue warrants and preside at adversary hearings and
trials. It has been stated:
There is perhaps no area of criminal law in such utter state of
confusion and frustration as that visited upon the publication and
dissemination of obscene material. "Confusion now hath made its
masterpiece." (Macbeth, Act II).'
The difficulty is further compounded by the fact that obscen-
ity is considered a mixed question of law and fact, and thus a
jury's decision as to the obscenity of given material does not carry
the same weight as in the normal case in which a reviewing court
will not reverse if there is substantial evidence supporting the
verdict. 34 In the area of obscenity, reviewing judges have decided
that they must view the offending materials themselves since
obscenity is not solely a fact question. Yet each judge is a product
of his own particular environment with regard to upbringing,
moral and religious training, and educational and cultural influ-
ences. As Judge Pettine stated in United States v. Fifty
Magazines: 1'5
"2A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 212 (1964); Marcus v. Search War-
rant, 367 U.S. 717, 730 (1961); Cinema Classics, Ltd. v. Busch, 339 F. Supp. 43, 48-49
(C.D. Cal. 1972).
'=People v. Kirkpatrick, 64 Misc. 2d 1055, 316 N.Y.S.2d 37, 42 (Crim. Ct. 1970), aff'd,
329 N.Y.S.2d 769 (App. T. 1971).
"'Mr. Justice Harlan in his opinion in Roth noted that if "obscenity is to be sup-
pressed, the question whether a particular work is of that character involves not really an
issue of fact, but a question of constitutional judgment of the most sensitive and delicate
kind." 354 U.S. at 497-98. See also Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1964).
For an application of this principle, see United States v. A Motion Picture Film
Entitled "I Am Curious-Yellow", 404 F.2d 196, 199 (2d Cir. 1968), setting aside a jury's
verdict that IAm Curious-Yellow was obscene. See Wagonheim v. Maryland State Bd. of
Censors, 255 Md. 297, 258 A.2d 240 (1969), which, in effect, upheld the barring of a license
to show I Am Curious- Yellow in Maryland.
'1323 F. Supp. 395 (D.R.I. 1971).
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It is not an overstatement to say that one's own tastes, values and
standards have been molded by a set of stimuli which are unique to
him and to his cultural milieu, and those standards inevitably influ-
ence one's particular judgment as to what constitutes hard-core por-
nography.'
Indeed, it is for this reason that appellate judges in the same case
may differ as to whether a given book, pamphlet, magazine, mo-
tion picture, or other medium of communication is obscene vel
non. 3 7 For the same reasons, individual magistrates and judges,
in issuing warrants or in presiding at adversary hearings and
trials, may differ in making a factual-legal decision as to whether
given matter is obscene. Nevertheless, judicial officials must have
some concrete guidance and must not act solely on personal
predilection.
As with any normal search warrant application, a magistrate
or judge cannot rely on the conclusory assertions of the affiant,
but must be given sufficiently detailed factual information to
make an independent judgment as to whether or not the law
enforcement officials have sufficient cause to make a seizure con-
sistent with the requirements of the fourth amendment. This
requirement is even more demanding since the issuing magistrate
must be satisfied that the three elements of the Miller test are
met under a probable cause standard.'38 It would appear that
considerable detail in the affidavit would be required-much in
the form of a book report for an allegedly obscene novel or book
or a narrative time and motion explanation in connection with an
allegedly obscene stag or motion picture film-if the magistrate
is to be satisfied that the Miller test is met. 39 The more summary
"'Id. at 402.
11
7See United States v. A Motion Picture Film Entitled "I Am Curious-Yellow", 404
F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1968) (compare the views of Circuit Judge Hays for the majority and
the views of Chief Judge Lumbard, dissenting); Wagonheim v. Maryland State Bd. of
Censors, 255 Md. 297, 258 A.2d 240 (1969), a 4-to-3 decision upholding a local circuit court
ruling that l Am Curious-Yellow be banned from exhibition in Maryland as being obscene.
In reviewing the Maryland Court of Appeals action, the United States Supreme Court
divided four to four with Justice Douglas abstaining.
""The affidavit in Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961), was con-
demned because it was based on conclusory assertions, as was the affidavit in Lee Art
Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636 (1968). See also Hanby v. State, 479 P.2d 486, 493
(Alas. 1970).
'See Overstock Book Co. v. Barry, 436 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1970), where an undercover
policewoman's affidavit consisted of 32 paragraphs and described the material in graphic
detail according to the court; State v. Eros Cinema, Inc., 264 So. 2d 615, 616 (La. 1972),
where the court observed that the officer who viewed the films gave numerous details of
what was pictorially depicted, fully descriptive, "reciting in detail the various sexual
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the presentation by the affiant, the more likely the facts may be
colored by the affiant's opinions and moral judgments.
Under the fourth amendment a warrant must describe with
particularity the items. or things to be seized. This specificity
requirement is even more stringent "where first amendment
rights are involved.""'4 The warrant must describe with "scrupu-
lous exactitude" the things to be seized when the "things" are
books, magazines, newspapers, other forms of publications, or
stag or motion picture films."' For example, a warrant which
described the property to be seized as "reels of 8 millimeter film,
playing cards, books, magazines, photographs and other similar
material which are obscene, lewd, lascivious and filthy as defined
under Section 1465, Title 18, U.S. Code" was held invalid as
giving too broad discretion to the executing law enforcement offi-
cials as to what was to be seized, becoming in effect a general
warrant.'4 2 On the other hand it has been suggested that where a
warrant commands, for example, the seizure of films "depicting
natural and unnatural sexual acts," this would have restricted
significantly the discretion of the executing officials, and it is
intimated that such a warrant would be sufficient."'
activities performed in the film." See also Monica Theatre v. Municipal Court, 9 Cal.
App. 3d 1, 16, 88 Cal. Rptr. 71, 82 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970), observing that one or more
affidavits submitted to a magistrate can be composed in a manner "to focus searchingly
on the question of obscenity . . . Detailed pictorial word description of the continuity
of the film plus the opinions of experts, whose qualifications are adequately given, can
serve this purpose initially." See Commonwealth v. State Amusement Corp., 356 Mass.
715. 248 N.E.2d 497 (1969); and the description of the affidavit involved in Perial Amuse-
ment Corp. v. Morse, 482 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1973).
""United States v. Cangiano, 464 F.2d 320, 325 (2d Cir. 1972); Flack v. Municipal
Court, 66 Cal. 2d 981, 429 P.2d 192, 59 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1967). See also note 130 supra.
''Cf. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476. 485 (1965) (seizure of materials associated with
the Communist Party).
"2United States v. Cangiano, 464 F.2d 320. 326 (2d Cir. 1972). See also Marcus v.
Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717. 732 (1961); Gregory v. DiFlorio, 298 F. Supp. 1360
(W.D.N.Y. 1969).
Query whether a warrant which authorizes a search for and seizure of "the magazines
'Modern Girls' and 'Girls' as well as other magazines of a similar appearance and con-
tents" is sufficient in describing with particularity what is to be seized. See Huffman v.
United States, 470 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1971), which involved such a warrant, but wherein
the court did not deal with this issue.
"'United States v. Marti, 421 F.2d 1263, 1268 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
947 (1971). However, in Cinema Classics, Ltd. v. Busch, 339 F. Supp. 43, 46-48 (C.D. Cal.
1972), when faced with a warrant which described the items to be seized, in part, as "eight
millimeter color and/or black and white films which are sexually oriented and which
depict specific acts of oral copulation, sexual intercourse and masturbation." which the
court had characterized as being quite limited in the description of what could be seized
thereunder, and with the particularity issue, the court felt that it was involved in a gray
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In Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia,'44 the Supreme Court
held that the admission into evidence of allegedly obscene motion
picture films seized under the authority of a warrant issued by a
justice of the peace on an affidavit giving the films' titles, and
stating that the affiant had determined from personal observa-
tion of the films and of the theater's billboard that they were
obscene, was erroneous. The affidavit did not set forth sufficient
factual bases for the officer's conclusions to allow the justice of
the peace to make an independent determination of probable
obscenity. The Court noted that it might not be as convenient for
a judge to see a movie in his chambers as it would be for him to
read a book, but the Court avoided further discussion on this
issue and decided the case on the grounds that the procedure
under which the warrant was issued was constitutionally defec-
tive in that it failed "to focus searchingly on the question of
obscenity."
45
A warrant should not issue to seize more than the number of
copies needed for evidentiary purposes. Thus, in Overstock Book
Co. v. Barry,"6 the court observed that instead of limiting the
seizure to a reasonable sample for evidentiary purposes, the offi-
cers seized over 17,500 books, magazines, and other materials.
The court held that "a seizure of materials obviously not needed
for evidence would, under the Fourth Amendment, be prima facie
unreasonable [and] would also result in the same immediate
suppressing effects" condemned by Marcus and A Quantity of
Books. 47 In Huffman v. United States, "I the court suggested that:
[i]f the Government's purpose in seizing such quantities [of a mag-
azine] was to refute any claim [by prospective defendants] that
the magazines were not in their possession for purposes of sale, this
end could have been accomplished simply by a temporary seizure,
accompanied by an offer to release the magazines [to the prospec-
tive defendants] upon execution of a stipulation as to the'number
of copies of each edition in their store."'
area of the law in which there was no clear guidance from higher courts. The distributors
had contended that the warrant contained no specific identification of the items to be
seized, en masse, of material which might fall outside of the definition of obscenity, such
as visual representations of human sexual intercourse in settings which would not be
obscene as indicated in United States v. 35 MM. Motion Picture Film "Language of
Love", 432 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1970). The court decided the case on other grounds.
"1392 U.S. 636 (1968).
"'Id. at 637, citing Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 731-32 (1961).
"436 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1970).
"'Id. at 1296. See also Potwora v. Dillon, 386 F.2d 74, 75-76 (2d Cir. 1967).
"470 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
"'Id. at 392.
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Heller v. New York, as did Lee Art Theatre v. Virginia, left
open the question of whether the issuing magistrate should view
an allegedly obscene motion picture prior to issuing a search war-
rant. The same question could be asked in connection with an
allegedly obscene book, magazine, or other publication. Fre-
quently, law enforcement officials may be able to purchase a copy
of a book or magazine and submit it as an attachment to the
affidavit, but this is not possible with a motion picture print.
However, as the court observed in Rage Books, Inc. v. Leary,5 '
the "police are not constitutionally required to fill the coffers of
suspects,""'5 and it should be sufficient if the affidavit describes
the contents of a book, magazine, or other publication in descrip-
tive detail.
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The problem of the issuing magistrate viewing a motion pic-
ture exhibition prior to issuance of a search warrant presents even
more complex issues. In Merritt v. Lewis' 3 the court observed
that the magistrate could "go to the theatre, view the film in
question, and determine if it was obscene," but he was not re-
quired to do so.'15 In People v. De Renzy 5 5 the court posed the
following question in connection with the magistrate's visiting the
theatre:
If so, should the visit be clandestine or open? The former would be
unfitting; a judge should not assume the role of an undercover inves-
tigator. If the magistrate makes his presence known, what reasona-
ble assurance exists that the exhibitor will show the film, thus per-
haps aiding in his own conviction? 5'
As illustrated by the actual situation in Heller v. New York,
where the judge viewed the motion picture film clandestinely
before issuing the search warrant, he may become a government
witness at the trial concerning the film in order to identify it as
the one he saw at a given time, date, and place and to establish
1'1301 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
"'Id. at 549.
'2See, e.g., Overstock Book Co. v. Barry, 436 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1970).
11'309 F. Supp. 1249 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
"'Id. at 1253.
'1275 Cal. App. 2d 380, 79 Cal. Rptr. 777 (Ct. App. 1969).
"5 'Id. at 384, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 781. See also Milonas v. Schwalb, 65 Misc. 2d 1042, 319
N.Y.S.2d 327 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. City 1971), in which the court discussed the propriety of a
judge who had viewed a motion picture prior to issuance of a search warrant and who
subsequently conducted an adversary hearing concerning that film. The court noted the
built-in bias of a judge toward upholding his prior action, thus compromising his impar-
tiality, and observed that in viewing the motion picture exhibition the judge becomes a
witness and a part of the accusatory process in issuing the warrant.
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the defendant's possession and exhibition of the same. A thought-
ful appraisal of this situation raises questions of whether under
these circumstances the judge has become a functional law en-
forcement official participating in the executive function with a
possible encroachment upon the separation of powers and the
neutrality and detachment which the judiciary should maintain.
III. THE Miller-Paris Adult Theatre SEQUEL
Although the Supreme Court has endeavored to establish
some concrete, definitive standards on obscenity for the police,
prosecutors, and judges, the question remains whether "the in-
tractible obscenity problem"'57 will persist to the consternation of
all the officials who must grapple with it. It is predicted that the
problem will remain, though in a somewhat muted form, since
concepts such as "appeal to the prurient interest in sex" or "lack
of serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value" involve
subjective value judgments and not merely simplistic factual de-
terminations.'5  Every judge, at least subconsciously, takes into
account his own moral, philosophical, and cultural background
every time he makes a decision on any matter before him, but this
is particularly so when obscenity is at issue. 15 In addition, it is
not a feasible alternative to the problem to leave the matter of
obscenity unregulated by law, for there must be some thread of
reason, tempered by a standard of decency imposed by society,
to govern this as well as other areas of the law. 6"
It is therefore apparent that each judge or magistrate will
have to confront the difficult constitutional issues involved in
'' 7Mr. Justice Harlan's characterization in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas,
390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (concurring and dissenting opinion).
, ,The United States Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, in commenting on
the Roth-Memoirs standard, stated:
These vague and highly subjective aesthetic, psychological and moral tests
do not provide meaningful guidance for law enforcement officials, juries or
courts. As a result, law is inconsistently and sometimes erroneously applied
and the distinctions made by courts between prohibited and permissible
materials often appear indefensible. Errors in the application of the law and
uncertainty about its scope also cause interference with the communication
of constitutionally protected materials.
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 59 (1970).
'"'See Mr. Justice Douglas' statement in dissent in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
93 S. Ct. at 2663: "Art and literature reflect tastes .... For matters of taste, like matters
of belief, turn on the idiosyncracies of individuals. They are too personal to define and
too emotional and vague to apply ....
'See Chief Justice Burger's statement in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct.
at 2636 n.10.
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each obscenity case. Undoubtedly, most conscientious judges at-
tempt to set aside-to as great an extent as possible-personal
moral judgments and try to apply objectively the pertinent ob-
scenity definitions and standards. It is in this area that the
change wrought by Miller may have its most profound impact, for
a finding of no obscenity under the old Roth-Memoirs test may
not be constitutionally permissible under the Miller standard.16'
This is especially significant in view of the Supreme Court's de-
termination that expert testimony is not necessary to support a
decision of obscenity and that the material can speak for itself."' 2
Perhaps of equal significance is the statement in Miller that
material need not be proven obscene under a hypothetical na-
tional standard but can be so established based on the prevailing
standards of the forum community. It appears that the courts will
have far greater difficulty in obscenity cases because of this
change.16
3
Although it might seem easier to obtain convictions or to
suppress allegedly obscene material as a result of the recent Su-
preme Court decisions, there is one statement in the Miller deci-
sion which imposes stricter requirements on the government:
[N]o one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of
obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe patently
offensive "hard core" sexual conduct specifically defined by the reg-
ulating state law, as written or construed." 4
This pronouncement has resulted in a substantial number of at-
tacks on state statutes which prohibit obscenity in such general
terms as "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent," on the
basis of overbreadth and vagueness. Thus far, most courts that
have dealt with this specificity requirement have been willing to
"'See, e.g., Jenkins v. State. 199 S.E.2d 18:3 (Ga. 1973), where the court in a 4-3
decision upheld an obscenity determination of the motion picture "Carnal Knowledge."
The dissenting justices indicated their amazement that what they considered to be an
anti-erotic movie could be considered obscene by anyone, particularly appellate judges.
Certiorari has been granted by the Supreme Court. Jenkins v. Georgia, 42 U.S.L.W. 3347
(Dec. 10, 1973). For an equally illustrative decision as to how the difference between the
Roth-Memoirs standards and the Miller test can be significant, see United States v.
Thevis, 484 F.2d 1149 (5th Cir. 1973), in which the court reviewed the conviction of the
defendants based on the transportation of obscene material by common carrier in inter-
state commerce. The court found that all of the 12 allegedly obscene magazines failed the
Miller test, but that six were not obscene under the Roth-Memoirs test.
"'Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2634-35 (1973).
"'See, e.g., Jenkins v. State, 199 S.E.2d 183 (Ga. 1973). See also Note, 51 DENVER L.J.
75 (1974).
"'93 S. Ct. at 2616.
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supply the necessary judicial construction to save even the broad-
est of obscenity statutes.65
CONCLUSION
An analysis and perception of the progeny of Miller, Paris
Adult Theatre, and related cases demonstrate that "the intracti-
ble obscenity problem" still exists and that the factual, legal, and
constitutional issues in obscenity cases will continue to be among
the most difficult and perplexing of those facing judges on both
the state and federal levels. That this is so is not remarkable, for
in the areas of freedom of speech and the guarantee against un-
reasonable search and seizure the courts must always be sensitive
to the rights of the individual. The line dividing obscenity and
constitutionally protected expression is dim and uncertain, and
each judge who is confronted with an issue in this area must be
careful to balance the competing interests of the individual and
society in such a way as to reflect accurately what the community
will tolerate as well as to prevent the dilution of the rights guaran-
teed by the first and fourth amendments.
"'E.g., the court in United States v. Thevis, 484 F.2d 1149, 1155 (5th Cir. 1973),
rejected such an attack on 18 U.S.C. § 1462, noting that the Supreme Court itself in
United States v. Twelve 200-foot Reels, 93 S. Ct. 2665 (1973), indicated, with reference
to 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a), that it was prepared to construe such terms "as limiting regulated
material to patently offensive representations or descriptions of that specific 'hard core'
sexual conduct given as examples in Miller ....
A majority of state courts have adopted a similar approach: see, e.g., Rhodes v. State,
283 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1973); State v. J-R Distributors, 512 P.2d 1049 (Wash. 1973). But see
Stroud v. State, 300 N.E.2d 100 (Ind. 1973), where the Indiana Supreme Court struck
down a statute that failed to satisfy, on its face, the Miller specificity standard.
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